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Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth
Correspondence, Coherence, or Pragmatist?
JUSTIN REMHOF
ABSTRACT: Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, 
while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This 
essay argues that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth are better situated within either 
the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth than the correspondence theory. 
Nietzsche’s thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he 
believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent 
on our actions.
KEYWORDS: truth, ontology, correspondence, coherence, pragmatism
Nietzsche’s conception of truth has received a lot of attention in recent decades. Unfortunately, there is no consensus about his position in the 
literature. Commentators have attributed nearly every common theory of truth 
to him, namely, correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist, while some have 
maintained that he simply has no theory of truth.1 My aim is to present passages 
regarding Nietzsche’s understanding of truth that suggest his remarks are best 
situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth rather than 
the correspondence theory. Nietzsche’s thoughts conflict with the correspon-
dence framework because he holds that the truth conditions of propositions are 
constitutively dependent on our actions.2 With these considerations, my aim is 
not only to call into question the interpretation that Nietzsche accepts the cor-
respondence theory, but also to explore new ways in which his remarks support 
the coherence theory, as well as develop a novel approach for reading him as a 
pragmatist about truth.
Consider first the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence 
 theory holds that a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the way things 
are and false if not. This theory assumes that something about the world,  typically 
objects, determines the representational success or failure of  propositions. Objects 
are often considered to be determinate with respect to their properties. That is, 
for every possible property F, an object must either have the property (be F), 
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or not have the property (be not-F). Objects with determinate properties form the 
truth conditions of propositions. On the correspondence theory, then, a proposi-
tion is true if there exists an appropriate object instantiating a property to which 
propositions correspond and false if not.3
It is helpful to distinguish two versions of the correspondence theory of truth. 
The metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, often associated with Kant, 
holds that objects have a determinate, fully mind-independent nature.4 By con-
trast, the neoclassical theory of truth, typically associated with Moore, Russell, 
and many recent analytic thinkers, only holds that objects have a determinate 
nature, not that they are fully mind-independent. Someone sympathetic to the 
neoclassical theory might contend that there is no use trying to utter true state-
ments about a fully mind-independent world, such as Kant’s noumenal world, 
but this does not mean that truth depends on our minds in any significant sense. 
We may need to be in some cognitive relation to trees, for instance, in order 
to utter true and false statements about trees, but this sort of dependence is 
relatively trivial: the truth conditions of propositions are not mind-dependent. 
According to the neoclassical theory, then, the truth conditions of propositions 
are cognitively accessible but mind-independent.
What is Nietzsche’s relation to these theories of truth? It is widely accepted that 
he rejects the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth.5 That theory posits 
objects that are in principle independent of our mode of cognition. Nietzsche 
holds that we can have no conception, or only a contradictory one, of something 
in principle independent of our mode of cognition. Thus, something “in itself,” 
he remarks, is “unthinkable” (GM III:12).6 The conception of objects posited by 
the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth is either empty or incoherent. 
This gives Nietzsche reason to reject the metaphysical theory. However, many of 
Nietzsche’s remarks appear to assume the neoclassical correspondence theory.7 
For example, he often argues that religious people’s beliefs about causality fail 
to correspond to features of reality (e.g., A 15). If Nietzsche were to accept the 
neoclassical theory, however, he would most likely deny that the truth conditions 
of propositions are mind-independent.
He writes, “The will to truth is a making fixed [Fest-machen], a making true 
and lasting [ein Wahr-, Dauerhaft-machen] [. . .] a reinterpretation into  something 
that is [or has being] [eine Umdeutung desselben ins Seiende]. ‘Truth’ is thus 
not something there that must be found out, discovered [Wahrheit ist somit nicht 
etwas, das as ware und das aufzufinden, zu entdecken ware], but something that 
must be made and that provides the name for a process—or rather for a will to 
overcome, a will that left to itself has no end: inserting truth as a processus in 
infinitum, an active determining [actives Bestimmen], not a becoming  conscious 
of something that is ‘in itself’ fixed and determinate [fest und bestimmt]” (KSA 
12:9[91]).8 The activity of establishing truths brings determinate  satisfaction 
conditions for propositions to correspond into existence. For a proposition to be 
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determinately true or false something must be constructed, that is, interpreted 
into “something that is [or has being].” The need to establish truth motivates 
this construction process. One might think that on Nietzsche’s view we must 
construct the meanings of terms. After all, for a proposition to be determinately 
true or false its terms cannot be meaningless, altering meanings affects truth 
conditions, and we clearly create the meanings of our terms. However, the pas-
sage seems to target the objects of reference of true and false propositions. Truth, 
Nietzsche says, is “an active determining,” which he contrasts to “something that 
is ‘in itself’ fixed and determinate.” Meanings are not “fixed and determinate” 
apart from our “active determining,” but it is commonly thought that objects have 
a “fixed and determinate” nature apart from our activities. Truth is not “out there” 
waiting to be “found out” and “discovered,” but “something that must be made,” 
Nietzsche says, since truth requires constructed objects. Constructing objects 
establishes truth because objects constitute the truth conditions of propositions.
Nietzsche claims that a “name” must be created for an object to be “made” 
(KSA 12:9[91]; see also 12:9[89]). This is explained in a crucial Nachlass 
entry: “A ‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept” 
(KSA 13:14[98]; cf. GS 58).9 Nietzsche adopts Kant’s view that concepts 
 organize, or “synthetically unify,” sensory information into objects. “Concepts,” 
Nietzsche remarks, “are more or less definite image signs for often recurring 
and associated sensations, for groups of sensations” (BGE 268). While Kant 
argues that the concepts that structure experience are a priori and necessary, 
however, Nietzsche maintains that concepts are exclusively formed in relation 
to our contingent needs, interests, and values. On Nietzsche’s view we fashion 
concepts that organize “effects,” specifically properties,10 and organized collec-
tions of properties form objects. Thus, “A thing = its qualities, but these equal 
everything which matters to us about that thing; a unity under which we collect 
the relations that may be of some account to us” (KSA 12:2[77]).
Nietzsche locates the view that we construct objects in history: “The reputa-
tion, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of a thing 
[. . .] has, through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, 
slowly grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body: what started 
as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts 
as its essence! [. . .]—But let us also not forget that in the long run it is enough 
to create new names and valuations and probabilities in order to create new 
‘things’” (GS 58). Elsewhere he ties this process of construction to truth: “‘Thus 
and thus it shall be’—that stands at the beginning: later, often after a long series 
of generations, it becomes a ‘thus it is.’ Later it’s called ‘truth’; at first it was a 
will to see something thus and thus, to name it thus and thus, a saying Yes to a 
value-creation of one’s own” (KSA 11:34[264]). According to Nietzsche we play 
an essential role in bringing objects into being by creating concepts that organize 
the world in experience in relation to our concerns. These efforts eventually 
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solidify referents that determine the truth conditions of propositions. The truth 
conditions of propositions are then constitutively dependent on our actions in 
the sense that our contributions are essential for providing the conditions that 
determine representational success or failure.
Nietzsche’s view that we construct objects can be made consistent with the 
neoclassical correspondence theory, but only on the condition that objects are not 
conceived as having determinate natures independently of our actions. Those who 
embrace the neoclassical theory would likely deny the condition. Commentators 
who claim that Nietzsche embraces the neoclassical theory believe Nietzsche 
denies the condition as well. For instance, Robert Nola writes that on Nietzsche’s 
account “correspondence truths” are “found or discovered,”11 and Maudemarie 
Clark argues that Nietzsche adopts a “common sense version of the correspon-
dence theory of truth” according to which true propositions correspond to objects 
that exist “independently of our representations of [them].”12 Nietzsche certainly 
thinks truths correspond to “found or discovered” objects within established 
representational frameworks, but correspondence first requires us to “posit 
and arrange a world that shall be called true by us” (KSA 12:9[97]).13 Objects 
independent of us do not determine which propositions correspond or fail to 
correspond.
Nietzsche’s view that we construct the truth conditions of propositions is 
better situated within the coherence theory of truth than the correspondence 
theory. According to the coherence theory, the truth of a proposition consists 
in its coherence with some specified set of propositions. Coherence at least 
requires consistency, though it typically indicates something stronger, such 
as mutual explanatory support between propositions.14 The candidate for the 
specified set of propositions for a proposition to cohere is often the largest set 
currently accepted by the best sciences. Nietzsche appears sympathetic to the 
coherence theory when he remarks, “An isolated judgment is never ‘true,’ never 
knowledge; only in the connection and relation of many judgments is there any 
surety” (KSA 12:7[4]; cf. GM III:12, GS 260).15 The “connection” and “rela-
tion” between propositions appears to signal mutual explanatory support.16 For 
example, Nietzsche maintains that science operates with various “magnitudes” 
that are held “constant” by inquirers such that “the conclusions of science acquire 
a complete rigorousness and certainty in their coherence with one another; one 
can build on them” (HH 19).17 Scientific representations about phenomena such 
as magnitude have strong explanatory power if they cohere with one another.
The coherence theory of truth differs from the correspondence theory in at least 
one important respect. This difference provides reason to believe that Nietzsche’s 
thoughts on truth are better understood through the lens of the coherence posi-
tion. On the coherence theory the truth conditions of propositions consist in 
other propositions rather than mind-independent objects. The coherence theory 
holds that a true proposition consists in its coherence with a system of beliefs, 
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not in its relation to objects that exist independently of our representations of 
them.18 The coherence theorist need not deny that propositions are made true 
or false by objects, however. It could be the case that objects are constituted by 
the coherent system of beliefs and true propositions are those that correspond to 
objects so constituted.19 Nietzsche’s view that we cannot make sensible judg-
ments about fully mind-independent objects, in conjunction with his position 
that constructed objects render propositions true or false, indicates that he might 
accept the coherence theory.
Importantly, the coherence theory is consistent with Nietzsche’s view that 
truth claims require empirical justification (see BGE 134). For Nietzsche it could 
be the case that coherence is that in which truth consists, while sense data are 
an essential criterion of truth. Sense data are “evidence” because they are the 
test of truth. To judge whether something is the case, Nietzsche thinks we must 
consider the various ways in which our senses are affected. However, the various 
ways in which we are affected is inseparable from our conception of how we are 
affected (see, e.g., KSA 11:38[10]; GS 57). Nietzsche says, “‘Truth’ is the will 
to be master over the multiplicity of sensations:—to classify phenomena into 
definite categories” (KSA 12:9[89]).20 Our being affected by a “multiplicity of 
sensations” provides a criterion of truth, and being “master” over the ways we 
are affected requires conceptual organization. If Nietzsche were indeed a coher-
ence theorist about truth, he could maintain that truth and falsehood consist in 
whether or not the various ways we represent how are affected makes our best 
system of beliefs coherent.
Whether Nietzsche accepts a correspondence or coherence theory of truth, he 
seems to believe truth and falsehood are products of our practical engagement 
with the world. “An arranged and simplified world,” he writes in the Nachlass, 
“is perfectly true for us; that is to say, we live, we are able to live in it: proof of its 
truth for us—” (KSA 13:14[93]).21 This suggests Nietzsche is a pragmatist about 
truth. The pragmatist theory of truth holds that a proposition is true if and only 
if it is useful. Commentators claim that for Nietzsche a useful belief “works,”22 
provides “utility,”23 ensures “happiness, satisfaction, or practical benefit,”24 
whatever is “valuable to the human species,”25 or whatever is “the criterion of 
survival and, at best, the increase of power of individuals or species.”26 These 
glosses are not very helpful, especially because they occur independent of the 
context of any pragmatist position. To clarify the meaning of usefulness it is 
best to discuss one such position.
In “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” the sixth lecture of Pragmatism,27 
William James applies the pragmatic maxim to truth. The pragmatic maxim is 
a methodological principle used to make our concepts clear. It holds that the 
content of a concept is identified in the consequences of what accepting it entails. 
James first agrees with the intuitive view that a proposition is true if and only 
if it corresponds to reality and false if not. The problem is that proponents of 
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this position often desire a semantics that renders truth “static,” meaning that 
if a proposition is true, it is presumed to be true at all times.28 James believes 
this conception of truth does not adequately capture the role of truth in inquiry. 
Concepts change and develop over time, and thus the truth conditions of proposi-
tions may alter as experience grows. James’s lecture uses the pragmatic maxim 
to clarify the role of truth in inquiry.
James finds that truths yield satisfactory results when acted upon.29 Truths are 
useful in the sense that they “help us to get into satisfactory relation with other 
parts of our experience.”30 A proposition functions satisfactorily when it can 
be integrated into the stock of accepted belief, confirmed, and checked: “True 
ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify.”31 Truths 
then tend not to conflict with subsequent experience. They “lead to consistency, 
stability and flowing human intercourse.”32 James’s view does not imply that 
a proposition is true if a person simply derives satisfaction upon believing it, 
or feels, as one commentator on Nietzsche puts it, “happiness, satisfaction, 
or practical benefit.”33 James rejects the position that the pragmatist regards 
“everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.”34 Assimilation, 
validation, corroboration, and verification are tests for truth independent of any 
individual’s personal happiness.
James also embraces the “humanist” view that truths are “man-made prod-
ucts.”35 Truths are “man-made” because true propositions reference constructed 
objects. “We break the flux of sensible reality into things [. . .] at our will,” he 
claims. “We create the subjects of our true as well as our false propositions.”36 
Sensory information, which we have no control over, provides an essential cri-
terion of truth, while truth consists in representing selected portions of sensory 
input.37 Selected portions of sense data form objects. For James a “thing” is 
something we “carve out” of sensory experience “to suit our human purposes,” 
particularly to employ true and false evaluations.38 In this manner, “Man engen-
ders truths upon [the world].”39
The preceding discussion suggests two ways James thinks truth is useful. 
Although he sometimes advances them in tandem, neither implies the other. The 
first is that true propositions lead to satisfactory results in inquiry. On this view 
truth conceived as a first-order evaluation is inseparable from usefulness. But 
what constitutes the truth conditions of propositions is also inseparable from use-
fulness. The ability to employ determinately true and false evaluations depends 
essentially on objects constructed in accordance with satisfying our interests. 
The controversy over whether Nietzsche accepts pragmatism about truth focuses 
on the first of these two positions. But commentators have overlooked that 
Nietzsche accepts the second. Nietzsche’s understanding of how constructing 
objects establishes truth and falsity agrees with James’s view. For Nietzsche 
descriptive representations are organizational instruments that render the world 
in experience manageable. Rendering the world in experience manageable is 
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partly accomplished by constructing objects. Constructing objects establishes 
truth conditions of propositions. This construction process is vital for both James 
and Nietzsche because, as Nietzsche writes, “we can comprehend only a world 
that we ourselves have made” (KSA 11:25[470]); cf. GS 301).
Three passages in Nietzsche’s texts are often cited to support the view that he 
rejects pragmatism about truth. It will emerge, however, that each is consistent 
with at least one of the two ways James thinks truth is useful. Most importantly, 
all passages are consistent with the second way, according to which the truth 
conditions of propositions are essentially connected to our interests. This should 
prompt a reexamination of Nietzsche’s relation to pragmatism about truth.
In the first passage Nietzsche remarks, “Something might be true while being 
harmful and dangerous to the highest degree” (BGE 39). If a true proposition 
is “dangerous to the highest degree,” the objection goes, truth is not always 
useful.40 This objection targets James’s view that true propositions yield satis-
factory results. Nietzsche continues by saying that because there are dangerous 
truths, “the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much 
of the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what 
degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, 
falsified” (BGE 39). The claim that truths are “harmful” and “dangerous” does 
not imply that truths fail to deliver successful results—they do so all too well! 
If truths did not so deliver, then for one to “endure” them they would not need 
to be “thinned down.” Nietzsche thinks some truths need to be “shrouded” or 
“sweetened” because they may negatively impact a preconceived understanding 
of the world, but this is not in conflict with James’s position.
In the second passage Nietzsche comments, “A belief, however  necessary 
it may be for the preservation of a species, has nothing to do with truth” 
(KSA 12:7[63]).41 Assuming a belief that allows for “the preservation of a 
 species” is useful, this appears to be a straightforward rejection of the pragmatic 
theory of truth.42 This objection also targets James’s view that true propositions 
lead to successful consequences. Yet Nietzsche goes on to remark that a life-
preserving belief “has nothing to do with truth” because, for example, “we have 
to believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling compelled to grant them 
absolute reality” (KSA 12:7[63]). Pragmatic beliefs have “nothing to do with 
truth” only if truth requires some “absolute reality.” For Nietzsche an “absolute 
reality” is a fully mind-independent world. Thus, life-preserving beliefs can be 
true provided that one rejects the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, 
which Nietzsche does.
In the final passage Nietzsche claims, “The falseness of a judgment is for 
us not necessarily an objection to a judgment. [. . .] The question is to what 
extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even 
species-cultivating” (BGE 4). This is incompatible with James’s view that 
true propositions generate satisfactory results. While James holds that it is 
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more advantageous to hold true beliefs than false ones,43 Nietzsche disagrees 
(see, e.g., GS 344). Insofar as life-preserving beliefs may actually be false—
and according to Nietzsche we must “recognize untruth as a condition of life” 
(BGE 4)—Nietzsche appears to side against pragmatism about truth. The 
 objection depends on Nietzsche’s understanding of false in the passage. 
He  continues, “Without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring real-
ity against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, 
without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not 
live” (BGE 4). The examples indicate that life-preserving beliefs involving logic 
and mathematics are false. Nietzsche’s reasoning is that “Logic (like geometry 
and arithmetic) [. . .] applies only to fictitious entities that we have created” 
(KSA 12:9[97]; see also HH 11, 19; GS 111; BGE 21).44 Logical and  mathematical 
propositions are false because they fail to refer in a world that exists  independently 
of our contributions. This indicates that on Nietzsche’s view propositions 
expressed in life-preserving beliefs can be true if considered within domains 
of constructed objects. Life-preserving beliefs can be true, despite the fact that 
they may also be false. This agrees with James’s position that a proposition’s 
truth conditions are inseparable from usefulness.
In conclusion, I have suggested that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth are better 
situated within either a coherence or pragmatist theory of truth than a correspon-
dence theory. The coherence theory supports Nietzsche’s view that truth consists 
not in correspondence to mind-independent objects, but in coherence with other 
propositions. The pragmatist theory agrees with Nietzsche’s position that the 
truth conditions of propositions are essentially tied to concerns that inform 
object construction. Moreover, I have suggested that the primary passages used 
to support the view that Nietzsche rejects pragmatism about truth do not neces-
sarily do so. These considerations, I hope, reveal new ways of understanding 
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